Political Mirages
In the Democratic presidential primary of 2008, Obama pursued a strategy of accumulating as many delegates as possible. Clinton racked up some highly visible victories and (according to Wikipedia) came extremely close in the popular vote, but Obama had the delegates and so he got the nomination.
Along the way, Clinton enjoyed considerable strength with white working class voters. I have a vivid memory of Clinton drinking whiskey with voters in a sign of her common touch. Why was Clinton popular with these voters? You can come up with any number of explanations. An arguably sexist one is that they had fond memories of her husband's presidency. Perhaps they were, consciously or unconsciously, uncomfortable with voting for a black man. Or, most favorably to Clinton, maybe she just struck a chord with them. They admired her intelligence and toughness.
In truth it was probably a mix of these and other reasons. But the lesson that the Clinton camp took from it was that she was good at winning white working class votes, particularly in Appalachia and the midwest. You know what's coming, so I want to emphasize that this wasn't necessarily wrong in 2008. Had Clinton won the nomination, quite possibly these same voters would have supported her again in the fall (particularly against mega-wealthy perma-hawk John McCain).
But of course it was the last time she could run as the 2008-vintage Clinton. By the time she needed those votes again, a lot of water had passed under the bridge, and while she ran up big margins with a lot of constituencies, Sanders enjoyed a surge of rural white voters—the very voters who were supposed to be Clinton's particular strength. Clinton shrugged it off and ran up big margins with blacks, Latinos, and others, ultimately crushing Sanders by a far larger margin than Obama's in 2008. But in November her weakness with white working class voters, particularly in Appalachia and the midwest, doomed her to an excruciating narrow loss. Her strength had been a mirage.
In 2016, Sanders drew the same implication from his strength with white rural voters that Clinton had in 2008: they like me, they really like me. And again, I don't think this was necessarily wrong at the time. Sanders has cultivated an image as an outsider, a truth-teller, and it's understandable that he might appeal to people disenchanted with politics as usual. But as in 2008, there are other possible explanations. In addition to his image as an outsider, Sanders has built a reputation for despising the Democratic Party establishment. Moreover, Clinton was the presumptive nominee and was likelier to win the general election than Sanders. Accordingly, voters interested in boosting Trump's chances could (in certain states) vote in the Democratic primary to weaken Clinton and usher in a Trump presidency. Others might simply have detested Clinton. Those voters often pulled the lever for Sanders.
It is understandable that in 2020 Sanders assumed that these voters were a stable part of his coalition and that all he needed to do was expand his appeal to Latinos and blacks, notable sources of weakness in 2016. On top of that, if white, conservative, Trump-leaning voters are a durable part of the coalition for socialism, then its political prospects are quite good, not just in primaries but in general elections. It is understandable that Sanders would conclude that socialism is a winning platform.
But when Sanders looked for his rural and/or conservative white supporters to turn out again in 2020, they were gone. Their votes were contingent on a set of circumstances that no longer pertained. Socialism is not, in fact, popular with white, conservative, Trump-leaning voters. Its (relative) success in the 2016 primaries was a mirage.
It is understandable that first Clinton and then Sanders believed in their mirages. In a democracy political power flows from popular support, and confessing that some of that support is illusory is a near-suicidal act. You have to assume that your voters are loyal or you might as well pack it in. But parties do not have the luxury of chasing mirages. When Sanders failed to replicate his 2016 success, the party acted with uncharacteristic discipline and effectiveness to prevent him from using a "minority of a minority" to drag the party into likely electoral defeat in the fall. Sanders and his supporters can complain that moderates uniting their vote behind a single candidate deprives him of a chance at winning the nomination with weak support, but the truth is that he is failing to turn out the voters that could have built a winning coalition: the young people who still aren't showing up to vote and the rural white voters who were probably always a mirage.
Along the way, Clinton enjoyed considerable strength with white working class voters. I have a vivid memory of Clinton drinking whiskey with voters in a sign of her common touch. Why was Clinton popular with these voters? You can come up with any number of explanations. An arguably sexist one is that they had fond memories of her husband's presidency. Perhaps they were, consciously or unconsciously, uncomfortable with voting for a black man. Or, most favorably to Clinton, maybe she just struck a chord with them. They admired her intelligence and toughness.
In truth it was probably a mix of these and other reasons. But the lesson that the Clinton camp took from it was that she was good at winning white working class votes, particularly in Appalachia and the midwest. You know what's coming, so I want to emphasize that this wasn't necessarily wrong in 2008. Had Clinton won the nomination, quite possibly these same voters would have supported her again in the fall (particularly against mega-wealthy perma-hawk John McCain).
But of course it was the last time she could run as the 2008-vintage Clinton. By the time she needed those votes again, a lot of water had passed under the bridge, and while she ran up big margins with a lot of constituencies, Sanders enjoyed a surge of rural white voters—the very voters who were supposed to be Clinton's particular strength. Clinton shrugged it off and ran up big margins with blacks, Latinos, and others, ultimately crushing Sanders by a far larger margin than Obama's in 2008. But in November her weakness with white working class voters, particularly in Appalachia and the midwest, doomed her to an excruciating narrow loss. Her strength had been a mirage.
In 2016, Sanders drew the same implication from his strength with white rural voters that Clinton had in 2008: they like me, they really like me. And again, I don't think this was necessarily wrong at the time. Sanders has cultivated an image as an outsider, a truth-teller, and it's understandable that he might appeal to people disenchanted with politics as usual. But as in 2008, there are other possible explanations. In addition to his image as an outsider, Sanders has built a reputation for despising the Democratic Party establishment. Moreover, Clinton was the presumptive nominee and was likelier to win the general election than Sanders. Accordingly, voters interested in boosting Trump's chances could (in certain states) vote in the Democratic primary to weaken Clinton and usher in a Trump presidency. Others might simply have detested Clinton. Those voters often pulled the lever for Sanders.
It is understandable that in 2020 Sanders assumed that these voters were a stable part of his coalition and that all he needed to do was expand his appeal to Latinos and blacks, notable sources of weakness in 2016. On top of that, if white, conservative, Trump-leaning voters are a durable part of the coalition for socialism, then its political prospects are quite good, not just in primaries but in general elections. It is understandable that Sanders would conclude that socialism is a winning platform.
But when Sanders looked for his rural and/or conservative white supporters to turn out again in 2020, they were gone. Their votes were contingent on a set of circumstances that no longer pertained. Socialism is not, in fact, popular with white, conservative, Trump-leaning voters. Its (relative) success in the 2016 primaries was a mirage.
It is understandable that first Clinton and then Sanders believed in their mirages. In a democracy political power flows from popular support, and confessing that some of that support is illusory is a near-suicidal act. You have to assume that your voters are loyal or you might as well pack it in. But parties do not have the luxury of chasing mirages. When Sanders failed to replicate his 2016 success, the party acted with uncharacteristic discipline and effectiveness to prevent him from using a "minority of a minority" to drag the party into likely electoral defeat in the fall. Sanders and his supporters can complain that moderates uniting their vote behind a single candidate deprives him of a chance at winning the nomination with weak support, but the truth is that he is failing to turn out the voters that could have built a winning coalition: the young people who still aren't showing up to vote and the rural white voters who were probably always a mirage.
posted by James | 11:27 AM
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