The Same Grape
Tarun and I had an argument about the death of normativity. I argued that normativity is just values + facts about the world, so unless we can agree on values, normative arguments simply become political battles. Tarun had a nuanced response, part of which was that it's worthwhile to debate facts about the world. Given a set of values, in other words, we still need to work through the logic to make sure our positions actually match our values. If we want to maximize utility, for instance, we can debate which policy will achieve that end. Tarun, if I'm misrepresenting your argument, too bad.
So anyway, I've detected a contradiction running through a lot of political debates recently (unfortunately, and for the second time in a few months, I set out to make an argument only to find it anticipated somewhere else, in this case on blogging heads tv).
Immigration and free trade aren't identical, but in terms of their effects on wages they are not much different. Both provide cheaper labor in one way or another, which means cheaper goods for us to consume. It also means lower wages for certain laborers.
Now the contradiction is that while it's become mildly disreputable to argue against free trade on the grounds that it lowers wages for low-income people, the same argument against immigration is treated as perfectly respectable. This doesn't make sense. If our values imply a certain tradeoff between efficiency and protection for our workers, then that balance should hold in both cases. Now, there are other factors that might lead you to accept one policy and reject the other. My point is merely that this particular argument has the same validity in both cases, but is taken seriously only when it comes to immigration.
Thus we are in a bizarre state of affairs. It's like refusing to drink syrah because the variety is inferior, but drinking shiraz at every opportunity. It's the same grape, and it's the same policy consideration, and to pretend otherwise is absurd.
So anyway, I've detected a contradiction running through a lot of political debates recently (unfortunately, and for the second time in a few months, I set out to make an argument only to find it anticipated somewhere else, in this case on blogging heads tv).
Immigration and free trade aren't identical, but in terms of their effects on wages they are not much different. Both provide cheaper labor in one way or another, which means cheaper goods for us to consume. It also means lower wages for certain laborers.
Now the contradiction is that while it's become mildly disreputable to argue against free trade on the grounds that it lowers wages for low-income people, the same argument against immigration is treated as perfectly respectable. This doesn't make sense. If our values imply a certain tradeoff between efficiency and protection for our workers, then that balance should hold in both cases. Now, there are other factors that might lead you to accept one policy and reject the other. My point is merely that this particular argument has the same validity in both cases, but is taken seriously only when it comes to immigration.
Thus we are in a bizarre state of affairs. It's like refusing to drink syrah because the variety is inferior, but drinking shiraz at every opportunity. It's the same grape, and it's the same policy consideration, and to pretend otherwise is absurd.
12 Comments:
Likewise it's okay to replace low-wage workers with machines but not with lower-wage workers.
This is why I advocate grinding up low-wage workers to make compost.
Some haphazard thoughts:
By “normative argument” I mean argument over values, as opposed to whether a position matches one’s values. Here are two examples that show why I’m against dismissing it too readily. First, suppose one takes the position that the privilege against self-incrimination is desirable because it's cruel to force suspects to choose among self-incrimination, perjury, and contempt of court. One may question why he finds this choice “cruel” – perhaps by comparing it to acceptable practices or by presenting psychological evidence. While the latter strategy entails a factual discussion, the former illustrates that it's worthwhile to make someone confront his different attitudes toward similar practices. Maybe in response he will genuinely assert a first principle in defense of the disparity, but, realistically, if he’s reasonable he will feel some tension and be compelled to reconsider. This means he will either change his mind or present another rationale. If the latter, the debate turns to whether this rationale proves too much (or too little). Sure, it's not the force of logical consistency, but normative argument does persuade people in a different way than mere emotional appeal. It enables people to reconceive of their normative judgments. (Another example: the Judith Jarvis Thomson article on abortion, which I haven't read.) Maybe it's just a valuable form of argument by analogy.
Similarly, suppose one maintains that attempted crimes and their successful counterparts should be punished equivalently because luck is irrelevant. Now, I’ve yet to read about this topic, but apparently one can respond, in part, by pointing out that accounting for luck is inescapable. If correct, this forces the first person to abandon or refine his position. Of course, this refinement will never be perfect – there are “counterexamples” to every rule – but it’s an improvement. (Similarly, in a world without discretionary enforcement, nuanced laws are preferable to simple ones.) This improvement is less likely when people demean normative discussion and are more likely to just agree to disagree, as if every normative debate is as fruitless as a direct argument over first principles.
I mean, maybe every normative debate is, ultimately, an argument over first principles. Normative debate doesn’t seem meaningfully different from a risk-averse person telling a more risky person that he’s wrong not to be more careful, because it’s so bad when things don’t pan out. But factual awareness isn’t always responsible for changes in normative judgments; people’s values change. I think good normative debate does this by making people reflect on their values (what exactly are they; what are they based on?), articulate them, and then refine or reject them. What’s so bad about that?
This argument is purely about the psychology of persuasion. I think you're right, of course, but by the same token, argument by appeal to nationalist chauvinism is also valuable.
The claim that an analogy among normative principles is a "special" kind of analogy is a factual argument as well. Is it true? Rowroh.
Posner apparently espouses some version of the normativity is dead position. He claims to think that moral argument is basically ineffective and worthless. However, he also appears to believe in moral progress (see his Slate exchange with Peter Singer). I think it's a combination of true observations about how hard it is to convince people to change basic beliefs, and incoherent bluster.
Anyway, Alan, you're totally right that moral argument is capable of producing results, for example in the examples you've given. But possibly you're taking a bigger position than that and I just missed it.
An appeal to national chauvinism is an example of a normative argument. If debated rationally (as opposed to in a way that abandons logic or would be psychologically "coercive" to certain segments of the population), it can be valuable.
You're right that I'm just talking about the psychology of persuasion. I think a strong attack on the "normativity is dead" thesis requires the establishment of moral facts. Over the summer Tarun made the argument that there are moral facts in the form of Moorean facts, and WWI broke out between him and James. I'm not qualified to send any troops. I just think the practical (at least in James's case) upshot of dancing on normativity's grave is rejecting too much normative discussion as just as fruitless as arguing over which flavour of ice cream is best. For the reasons I mentioned, it's often worth probing, prodding, and pumping intuitions because normativity is kicking in our daily lives (and so, at least, has practical import). Moreover, normative argument isn't a free-for-all (unlike the disputing of taste) because there are ground rules almost all of us accept (I don't mean shared values, but rather things like soft consistency). Maybe normative argument isn't the most effective way to change people's normative judgments (see Posner), but it shouldn't be hated on to the point that all moral argument is dead on arrival. James seemed to take the hater's position over the summer (e.g., claiming that any discussion about whether it's morally justified to eat meat is worthless; that no response is superior to "I just don't care about animals"). My view is that it can be worthwhile to question such assertions, even if their proponents ultimately stand by them.
I'm not sure I believe in your distinction between "psychologically 'coercive'" arguments and the merely "valuable." Maybe I'm jumping to conclusions; I know that was just a side remark. But is there really a meaningful distinction between psychological persuasion and psychological coercion? I guess the way I would approach it is to say that there are uses of nationalist arguments that don't seem to cohere with believed moral facts; those are the bad ones and they succeed by psychological coercion. But this requires accepting some high-level metaphysical judgments on the sole basis of primary intuition, again. I have a feeling that a broader examination will reveal that this is just one of a ton of "ground rules" successful moral discussion relies on.
There's nothing wrong with that, as James might say. Normative argument will still work sometimes.
Fair enough. I thought the distinction was shaky, too (coercion and persuasion are ranges in the same continuum); I was just fishing for another example of valueless normative argumentation. This is not to suggest that I think "psychologically coercive" arguments should be banned (they're not that coercive; how can we reliably identify them; free speech good, slippery slope bad; M1LL), just that they tend to have bad consequences. I'm referring to things such as hate-mongering, especially the religious (more coercive) kind, which rile people up and make them less inclined to reason (and more inclined to abuse).
That said, I disagree that "arguments that don't seem to cohere with believed moral facts" necessarily succeed by psychological coercion. (The "necessarily" was implicit in your argument, right?) Like, what if someone just doesn't believe these moral facts? Maybe this is a result of coercion (e.g., brainwashing), but maybe not.
"Like, what if someone just doesn't believe these moral facts?"
You're sort of right, but I included "believed" in order to rule this scenario out. You could still say, "Well, there's believed and there's believed," possibly. It was just an attempt at the distinction which I don't really believe in, though.
Oh, I thought you meant "believed" as in generally accepted.
SHUT UP, Goatse.
You think you're photogenic enough to appear on a video blog?
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