When Should We Brand People As Immoral?

Having written a rather long post about why I think reasonable people can disagree about how praiseworthy Charlie Hebdo is, I want to make a more general point about how we think about social norms.

Alan believes something like:  "It is immoral not to attend the PEN gala in honor of Charlie Hebdo."  Well, actually, that's not quite right.  Alan himself won't be in attendance, but presumably he isn't pointing the finger of blame at himself.  Why not?  Because he wasn't invited.

Fair enough.  Maybe Alan believes:  "It is immoral not to attend the PEN gala if you were invited."  But Caleb Crain probably was invited, and yet won't attend.  Why not?  Because he didn't read the email from PEN that contained the invitation.  (He may have deleted it without thought, or he may have unsubscribed from the list long ago.  We can't be certain.)

And yet Alan isn't pointing the finger of blame at Crain, either.  Why not?  Isn't there some kind of moral obligation to attend?

Apparently not.  It is fine not to attend the gala for reasons of convenience.  So let's try again.  "It is immoral not to attend the PEN gala if your reason for not attending is a matter of conscience."

Now this might seem bizarre, since the more natural approach might be to respect people's conscientious beliefs, at least where those beliefs are within the bounds of reason and decency.

But maybe we can explain it this way.  Alan has considered the matter, and he has decided that there can be no two opinions on whether Charlie Hebdo did enough to avoid humiliating Muslims.  So in other words, he disagrees with my previous blog post.  He doesn't think any reasonable person could possibly take the view that Charlie Hebdo crossed the line in its humiliation of Muslims.  And since no reasonable person could take that view, and the PEN dissenters are reasonable people, Alan concludes that darker motives are at play.  Hence the immorality of their stance, and hence the efforts of people like Caleb Crain to shame the dissenters for following the dictates of their consciences.

I suppose this makes sense.  Imagine a Catholic nun who sheltered Tutsis during the Rwandan genocide.  As a result of this bravery, the nun has been invited to attend a gala in honor of social justice.  The nun finds out that the gala intends to honor an abortion rights group that is fighting for on-demand, publicly-funded abortions.  The nun decides not to attend the gala, observing that according to her religious and moral beliefs, abortion is murder.  What I think Alan would say is something like, "Look, this nun is clearly committing an immoral act by declining to attend the gala."

Or imagine an animal rights activist who has been invited to a gala.  When she discovers that the gala will honor an organization dedicated to bringing American-style factory farming to the developing world, the animal rights activist declines to attend.  Alan might say, "Look, there are millions of people starving.  Are you really going to try to deny the developing world the agricultural tools that it needs to feed itself?  You are immoral for declining to attend the gala."

Or maybe not.  Maybe Alan would say that reasonable people can disagree about the morality of abortion, or factory farming, but not about the morality of humiliating Muslims.  I don't know.

My own opinion is that it makes no sense to attack people for taking a principled view on the question of whether Charlie Hebdo crossed the line when it repeatedly humiliated and provoked Muslims.  Do we really think there are no two legitimate opinions on this question?  Do we really want to embrace a kind of forced unanimity on this question, by shaming people whose views differ from our own?  Is it really morally mandatory to honor a publication that you believe went out of its way to humiliate a vulnerable and much-put-upon minority?

Lawyers who read this blog may recall the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the famous "flag-salute" case.  The question was whether students could be required to salute the American flag.  (The students who declined to salute were Jehovah's Witnesses who had principled objections to saluting the flag.)  Of course the dispute was about whether the government could legally compel students to salute the flag, and the Court determined that it could not.  But it strikes me that when political and moral issues are sufficiently complicated that reasonable people can disagree, it is as wrong to force people to salute Charlie Hebdo as it is to force them to salute a flag.  And that doesn't just apply to legal coercion, it applies to public shaming and accusations of immorality as well.  If you think Charlie Hebdo stayed on the right side of the line, then say so.  But does it really make sense to engage in a campaign of public shaming of the dissenters?  Does it make sense to try to intimidate them into not expressing their views?  To question their morality in public?

I think Caleb Crain and Alan bear a heavy burden if they want to demonstrate that it's immoral to decline to attend the gala for reasons of conscience.  They need to show, not just that Charlie Hebdo was on the right side of the line, but that this is so obvious that no reasonable person could take the opposite view.  I don't think they've met that burden.  I don't think they've come close.

[So to be clear about what I believe:  It is completely fine to express the view that Charlie Hebdo was on the right side of the line, if that is what you believe.  But I don't think makes much sense to ask, "Were the dissenters right to decline to attend the gala?"  That question is not really at issue on these facts.  Of course they were right to do what their consciences told them to do—how could any reasonable person think otherwise?  If you think they deserve to be criticized, it is because you believe this issue is so clear-cut that there are no two reasonable opinions, and therefore their consciences don't deserve anyone's respect.  In  other words, you want to exclude the view that Charlie Hebdo crossed the line from reasoned debate.  You believe that in this discussion there are no meaningful nuances, gray areas, or difficult questions.  This is a very hard argument to accept.]